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BACK PLAY

General running back play

It is my strong belief that much of what has been believed, written and practised about back play is simply wrong.

Here's the problem. Our very selective memory of successful open field play in the backs is dominated by wonderful individual efforts -- Jeff Wilson head-faking his man, Guscott sliding like silk through miraculous gaps, Norm Berryman side-stepping his opposite number out of his socks etc. Sadly, these miraculous moments are the exception rather than the rule. We seem, however, to be mesmerized by them and doomed to trying to replicate them rather than putting into place the platforms which make them possible. Hence the 12 Myths of Attacking Back Play inset:

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Who does what?

Not having been a back myself -- I wanted to be a center but by a combination of relatively poor eyesight in the days before contacts and being self-elected by my height for the line-out I played at lock and No.8 -- as a coach I have had to approach back play from a functional standpoint. Who does what? How does it work? And why? I must say that I don't expect that this approach brings anything very new to the subject but I do believe that of all the aspects of rugby that coaches must face back play (along with front row play) is traditionally, and somewhat mysteriously, opaque and as such it is a subject that lends itself to reappraisal.
Let's take inventory:

The backs, 9 through 15, operate in semi-formal units.
In attack these are

a) 9 and 10, the halves,
b) 10, 12, 13 and 15, the midfield unit (Strikers)
c) 9 and 11 and 9 and 14, often augmented by 15, the wide units and
d) 11 and 14, often augmented by, say, 7, the chase unit.

In defence the units are almost the same, but not quite. They are

a) 9, who with 6 and 8 has specific duties close to the set pieces and breakdowns,
b) 10, 12, 13 and the openside wing, the line, and
c) 11, 14 and 15, the cover.

Each of these units requires support from the other units both in attack and defence.
There are also informal units which develop with play in both attack and defence (see "Tactical Plan of Attack" below). These ad hoc units operate tactically rather than strategically and their members change continuously. These include the "arrow-head" strike unit in attack and the "zone" units in defence.
Each unit has its own decision maker, DM, who is the de facto "manager" of the unit. Note that the DM in every unit depends on information from the other members of the unit to make his decisions and that the DM may change within the unit depending e.g. on the phase of play. The DM may not even be part of the unit e.g. in the case of the chase unit which gets leadership usually from 9, 10 or 15. Note too that each unit may be supported by other forwards or other backs who also fall under the leadership of the DM. All team members need to know which unit they are in at any given moment, what the DM is proposing, and where it is likely to happen.

While the tasks assigned to each unit are mostly relatively straightforward -- in conception if not necessarily in execution! -- the range of tasks in some units is complicated.
Take the midfield unit in first-phase attack, for example: The DM, usually but not necessarily 10, is responsible for making the decisions as to

a) who will strike and where,
b) who will be involved in delivering the ball to the striker,
c) who will support the strike up to and including clean-up in the event of the striker being tackled
d) and who will be the finisher.

In a 4-man unit this results in a lot of work! The point is, however, that each member of the unit must be perfectly clear about what is supposed to happen and what his or her particular contribution to the attack will be. There are no options here, by the way. The unit expects deliverers to deliver the ball, strikers to strike and supporters to support. If they do ANYTHING else they throw the unit into turmoil.

It also means that every member of the back attack unit has the opportunity to prepare properly for what is to come. He or she can visualise the move and their part in it and mentally check off the interim objectives they must achieve. (If I was a cynic, which, of course, I'm not, I'd say that this is exactly what most backs don't ever do. Being free spirits they prefer just to let things happen - and it shows!) Seriously, these few seconds spent in preparation vastly improve performance - and provide an opportunity for feed-back review. Thus, the striker can make absolutely sure that he is in position to burst onto the pass he's expecting and the deliverer can make sure his feet and hands are in position to make the pass at the best speed, vector and level.

It is worth noting that the DM's decision implies the expected outcome of the attack. It is (should be) understood that until that outcome is achieved or an identifiable failure occurs the members of the unit will continue play their parts.

Thus, every member of the unit is expected to press the attack to its best conclusion by completing their assigned tasks before they take up position for the next phase. This is important. For example, if 12 is the designated striker and 10 and 13 are his primary supporters it is obvious that 13's responsibility does not end if 12 is tackled especially if 10 is the key player in the next phase. To my mind, the concept of pressing the attack (or any other action) to its best conclusion is critical. Far too often in both forwards and backs actions are simply abandoned with no objective having been attained.

As a partial aside: Take the case of 15, supported by 14, under a garryowen in his danger area just outside his 22 and in front of the posts. The minimum acceptable outcome here might be a kick into touch. But, things notoriously go wrong. If 15 spills the ball into the hands of the oncoming kicker and has to tackle him, should 14, reasonably expecting the opposition to make a quick recycle immediately hare off to cover his wing or should he deal with the breakdown? It seems to me that while there is still a chance to achieve the objective 14's job is clear -- which may mean that, say, 8 or 2 who didn't think they were part of the cover unit had better get on their bikes! This sort of approach is sometimes referred to as planning.

The question of where must also be dealt with. Fortunately this is usually less complicated. In attack, where the strike is made is guided by a) the game plan, b) a careful observation of the defensive alignment, c) the state of the game and d) an appreciation of the skills and abilities of the available unit members.
In defence the decision is even simpler. The place to defend is as far forward as possible.

How and why does it work?

When discussing back play the virtues of Taking the Ball at Pace, Running Straight, Passing Flat and so on are extolled, as they should be, in every rugby manual and are obviously at the core of successful attacks. You'll find my thoughts on these key concepts in "General Concepts"

Strikes are made by ball-carriers moving with clear, specific objectives. In general they achieve these objectives by penetrating the defensive screen; in other words they try to run where the defence isn't or more precisely where there are no defence Tackle Areas. This is called space. Space is an elusive beast. It comes and goes. The good news is that it only needs to be present for a fraction of a second to be useful, the bad news is that it's very hard to predict.

Looked at from an individual defender's viewpoint the space available to an attacker is dependent on the size of his (the defender's) tackle area (TA) and its position in time -- his TA being a potential thing rather than a fixed object. Again, the size of his TA has got to do with his physical size, his agility and his commitment. Its position has got to do with his starting position, his anticipation of events and his speed.
Given sufficient in-position defenders, a similar number of attackers and a limited area there is no actual or potential space -- except, of course, in front of the combined TAs and behind them.

Part of the task of attackers is thus to create space if it doesn't already exist. The if here is important. The game being what it is, before worrying about how to create space it is always better to exploit space that already exists. Defenders fall down, they get trapped in rucks and mauls, they fail to get into the proper position or there are simply not enough of them available to close all space. Thus, before trying to create space an attacker's first task is to spot exploitable space that already exists. And to communicate his discovery to his unit DM. Note that this spotting and communication may include identifying the actual but not necessarily apparent space provided by, say, a notoriously non-tackling opposition center. With the ball close to the left touchline there is almost always space on the right outside the opposing openside wing. But can it be exploited given unit skills and abilities?

As a last word on this subject it seems absolutely clear to me that designation of the striker is the most important decision that the DM can take. Mechanically passing the ball along the line hoping that one of the backs will take it upon himself to find or create space and actually run through it makes little or no sense. This isn't to say that it won't ever happen; skilled players can create their own space, but from an attack efficiency viewpoint it stinks. At the same time, it must never be forgotten that every member of the unit has the responsibility to be aware of and open to opportunities. Thus, no matter what it says above a designated ball deliverer presented with a real opportunity would incur my disappointment if he or she didn't take it. The trick, clearly, is to be able to evaluate the opportunities properly and unless they qualify to carry out the plan wholeheartedly.

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Creation of space

Space can be created cumulatively as well as by a single specific action. 10s, 12s and 13s commonly make a point of challenging their oppo aggressively early in the game to try to detect and hopefully exploit his weakness. A couple of thundering runs straight at your man - the proverbial Maori sidestep! - will sometimes have the effect of turning a tentative tackler into a non-tackler! Likewise, having encouraged bad habits in the defenders by a series of similar attacks a switch of strike target may provide space that didn't exist originally.

Creation of space by a ball-carrier depends on managing the position of a defender's TA and hence its co-ordination with the TAs of the other defenders. To do this the defender's speed and vector must be managed. Consider this example: You are running with the ball on a conventional vector slightly angled from left to right and all the defenders are drifting right to cover. If you could cause one of these defenders to stop dead you would have created space where that defender would have been. OK, so it's unlikely you can actually stop him in place without the use of a pistol, say, but you can almost certainly cause him to change vector to match your own (meanwhile his teammates continue their drift) which has the same effect. This process is referred to as "fixing" your man. Since you have the ball it's safe to assume that you also have his undivided attention -- you can usually ensure that you have his undivided attention by actually catching his eye!

-- so, to continue our example you first fix him by adjusting your vector slightly left i.e. you straighten. This ostensibly gives him all the information he needs to be able to tackle you and he will inevitably adjust his own speed and vector accordingly -- which means that he's fixed! He's under your control! You adjust, he has to adjust and you've got an advantage you can use. If, having first vectored left to fix him, you then, say, wrongfoot him with a well-timed swerve right so that he underruns you you've used the space you've created and you're through.

Note that in this example what you've done is fix him by straightening your vector. This is one of the keys to creating space. (Before the concept of fixing the man was widely understood the injunction from coaches used to be: "Straighten!" Now we know why!)

Another way to use the space you've created would be to offload to a supporter into the space the defender didn't fill. In both of these examples you've managed the defender's TA. Given equal numbers of attackers and defenders creation of space is thus almost completely a function of the ball-carrier's pace (and variation of pace), vector (and change of vector) and timing. The almost completely is because there are other factors.

The extra man ploy also creates space for two reasons. These are both a result of the fact that defenders always try to overlap their TAs forgetting that a TA is pretty much attacker specific. The TA that a defender sets up to deal with an attacker pursuing one vector may not be appropriate when faced with a different attacker who pops up suddenly with the ball and on a different vector. This creates a two-on-one situation in microcosm and if the extra man is looping player or a blind-side wing or 15 entering the line from behind his necessarily greater pace is often enough to penetrate. Thus, the properly managed defender is made to relinquish space by being made to mis-position his TA. This is done by managing his pace and vector or by presenting him with a situation likely to cause indecision.

Decoy runners may also help create space although to my mind their influence on the first potential tackler is very limited. Still, if a decoy can wrongfoot any part of the cover defence this provides an advantage. As mentioned under Deception Plays elsewhere, to be really useful decoys must be perceived to be capable of taking the ball. (The use of decoy runners in front of the ball is problematic. It's hard for me to see that they're not committing some sort of an offence even if I'm not sure what sort.)

Tactical plan of attack

So much for the more conventional side of back play. Now comes the method of delivering the attack.

There are two quite different situations for back attacks; first phase possession and second phase possession.

First-phase attack

First phase implies a measured, organized set-up, all players on both sides in position and 20m of space between backlines at line-outs and, say, 15m at scrums with a good liklihood of quick, clean ball. Looking at the numbers there are very approximately 30 line-outs and 20 scrums in the average game which suggests that first-phase possession will be gained by a team something like 25 times and quality first-phase possession say 20 times. A significant number of these opportunities will, of course, take place when for any number of reasons there is no real opportunity for a backline strike -- unless, that is, you’re losing by 4 with only 30 seconds on the clock!

However, 25 or so times during a match there is the luxury of time to set-up a planned, decisive attack and 20 times, say, the ball comes back quickly and cleanly and your prepared tactic is on. Subtract 5 for goal-line defensive situations (and ignoring the fact that the forwards will consume a goodly number of possessions for their own ends) and you still have, say, 15 serious attacking opportunities in every game. This being the case someone who didn’t know anything about rugby might be forgiven for expecting you to score 15 times.

But what actually happens? Sadly, no more than 10% to 20% of conventional first phase backline attacks are successful in breaking the opposition’s defence-line so 80% to 90% of these clean possessions are wasted.

Backline attacks fail because the break is not made. Somebody makes a poor pass, drops the ball, trips or falls over or, most often, the ball carrier is tackled or impeded and a ruck or maul develops. Ignoring the ball-skills failures for the time being we must face the fact that all of our planning and effort, not to mention the hours spent practicing moves, fails far too often. And what’s worse the failure is usually brought about by a single defender making a single tackle!

This seemed inexplicable to me when I first started to think about it and the more I thought and watched and wondered the more I began to think that we have been approaching first-phase back attacks completely wrongly.

In fact, I have come to believe that first phase attacks must be planned in a completely different way to improve their chance of success. My belief is that no matter how skillful our back line is we should expect that the tackle will occur and plan for it and to my mind this plan needs to involve not just the striker (see above) but also at least one but preferably two supporters and a finisher.

Let’s take a hypothetical situation. From a set piece the ball is delivered to a striker (usually a center or a wing/fullback joining the line) who fixes his man and charges for the gap he has created where statistically he’s likely to be tackled or at least impeded, usually by a single defender. To my mind the important thing now is to continue to press the attack and it is here that the attack plan comes into play.

One key to continuing the attack in this situation is obviously the quick release of the ball to another attacker.

Just to re-cap:-The defence situation at the moment of tackle is as follows:

• the tackler (13 in this example) is fully committed (on the ground or otherwise out of commission),
• the other backline defenders (10, 12 and 11, say) are changing gear -- i.e. shifting their TAs from their assigned men and either converging on the tackle in support, fanning sideways on the off-side line to man the new defensive line or charging back ( 10 in particular) to provide deep cover,
• the cover forwards are continuing towards the tackle ready to either stop the maul if the striker is still on his feet or recover the ball/defend the ruck if the striker is down,
• the other pack members who are not close to the tackle are slowing, stopping and looking for places to fill in the defensive line.

I.e. For the defence, this is not a moment (necessarily) of confusion but rather gear-changing! For the attacking team, however, this is the precise moment of opportunity when the continuation of the attack must be pressed. (If this moment passes and a ruck or maul is formed we are in a new phase with a new set of priorities.)

As we've seen continuation of the attack can be effected by the striker passing the ball out of the tackle (or immediately before if the tackler is actually committed ) to a close supporter who can continue the attack with no loss of pace or release the ball to the finisher who can take advantage of the moment between gears to burst clear.

This is where the arrow-head approach I mentioned above pays off. Given two supporters (one on each shoulder of the striker since it is only the striker who can realistically decide how he will attempt to beat his man) each ready to move the ball away to a finisher arriving at pace we can exploit the momentary advantage of the tackle gear-change. Note that it is not crucially important that the finisher be close -- just close enough to run onto the pass from depth and at pace.

But why not simply pass along the line to the next man when the striker sees that his own gap is closing? My answer to this is complicated but not complex.

First, because it is the striker’s assignment to beat his man and passing just because he thinks he can’t do this is not part of the plan. Making the proverbial hospital pass at this moment benefits nobody. (Obviously, however, if the next man is miraculously clear and the striker is definitely covered he should pass, having, of course, fixed and committed his own defender. In 1st phase play it is unlikely that this situation will occur, however.)

Second, because the tactic I am proposing depends to some extent on the striker’s defender being committed and thus effectively out of action creating an inequality.

Third, because the 'next' man isn’t in his conventional position in the line -- i.e. well covered by his own defender, 5m out and 1m back and gesturing vainly for the ball. He’s on the striker’s shoulder ready to put the second part of the tactic into operation at the precise moment that the defence is most vulnerable. Won’t the supporter’s man move in to cover him? Of course, but he will have difficulty positioning his TA because of the multiple possibilities of the situation. He will most likely stay well outside the supporter.

Fourth, because if the attack still breaks down there are 4 players in place to deal quickly with the breakdown. Note that the pack being on board with the tactic can concentrate on providing the second phase support they’re designed for. If the attack breaks down completely and the opposition move the ball away they are in place to deal with it. There are, of course, also 10 and 15 in place to deal with kicks.

Thus my scenario for an M1 back move is as follows:

9 to 10, flat miss-pass to 13.
12 and 14 slot in behind 13, 11 flies across and follows this arrowhead watching the defence.
13 fixes his man and dummies, swerves or sidesteps to beat him.
13 is tackled or impeded and off-loads (slip or pop-pass) to 12.
12 passes inside to 11 arriving at pace.
12 and 14 slot in behind 11 with 13 following.
and so on.....

How does this differ from conventional back play?

First in the disposition of the players. The tactic requires the active involvement of 4 backs each with a specific role in every 1st-phase attack. There are no more wings hanging out on the touchline either calling vainly for the ball or complaining they aren’t getting it but all the while too far away and too flat to provide effective support. There are also no more centers who, having, say, delivered the ball to the striker take the opportunity to study the weather.

Second in the flexibility it provides. For example successful grubbers and (to a lesser extent) the dreaded chip-and-chase are finally possible because the chase is in place.

Forwards have long appreciated that their best use in attack is in decisive action at the breakdown and immediately thereafter and it’s time for backs to learn the same lesson. Moving the ball smartly away from the breakdown and into the hands of a player arriving at pace wins games.

One point to remember: The conventional wisdom is that only the man with the ball is actually watched but backs in defence have learned to avoid this tendency so it is important that the attack lines up conventionally and only moves into the arrow-head when the ball is delivered to the striker.

Summary

I have to admit that this could sound like a very long winded way of saying “get more people to the breakdown” and “make the ball available in the tackle” but I believe it’s more than that. What is important is actually to plan for the likely outcome (the tackle) and to plan with a positive, achievable objective in mind. It has always been my contention that players play better if they know what is likely to happen and to know what is expected of them when it does.

And now the good news: What happens if the striker does beat his man? Well, I’d say that you are going to score. You’ve put three men behind the defence with the ball and you have a fourth screaming up. It’s going to take a heroic cover defence to stop you.

Second phase

Second-phase possession presents different conditions for attack planning.

If 1st phase possession is characterised by zero forward momentum at the outset 2nd-phase attacks are initiated under conditions of either positive momentum or negative momentum. The options available in these momentum states are quite different.

However, some conditions are the same irrespective of whether you are moving forward or on the back foot.

- the quality of the ball is uncertain.
- the players on both sides are rarely all in position.
- the attacking backs rarely have the time to communicate at any length so the tactic to be used depends solely on the DM’s call.
- sudden switches of side are available.
- the forwards are available to be involved.
- it is rare that the depth of the attack can be arranged.
- players are already (usually) up flat and it is difficult to change this in the time available

Thus, in general the outcome of second-phase attacks is much more unpredictable than first-phase attacks so care must be taken not to commit critical defensive coverers to every attack.

Positive momentum
Nothing succeeds like success and nothing provides scoring opportunities like pressing the advantage. They're on the back foot so make sure you keep them there.
Of course, some of the features of first-phase attacks still apply. The DM must still designate the striker and the other backs must make themselves available to deliver, support and finish.

Demand quick ball
This is crucial to maintaining forward momentum. For 2nd-phase back attacks to succeed 9 must deliver the cleanest, quickest ball possible. This means that the pack MUST cooperate and that 9’s communication with the pack is perhaps even more important than his communication with 10. In fact, ability to deliver quickly and smoothly from the breakdown along with the quality of their passes, is where 9s are measured. Dithering is fatal not only because it reduces the space that 10 will have but also because it saps the committment of the forwards.

Use inequalities ruthlessly
Second-phase back attacks have a slightly higher than normal chance of success in this area. It is rare that the defence is either all present or all in position. Back defenders get buried in rucks and mauls - especially if we planned it that way! - and their defence assignments are not always covered quickly. It takes great awareness to turn this to advantage, but spotting an inequality in the defence -- a prop covering a center, for example, should be exploited. There is no better time for backs to LOOK and get noisy!

Switch the point of attack
The necessessity to move the second-phase attack forward before the defence can organize means that back-lines must have developed patterns of play that they can call on. My feeling is that there should be a few rehearsed sequences in the kitbag which can be called even by a DM buried in a ruck but which one you use should, as usual, be based on your appreciation of the situation. If you've been attacking in the center of the field maybe it's time to go wide, if you've been pushing on the blind maybe it's time to go open, if they're all up get behind them. But whatever you do do it quickly.

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Negative momentum

Your forwards have made a #8 pick-up from the scrum but they've been stopped on their own side of the gain line and no defense backs have been involved. Suddenly the defense in only feet away. But wait! You still have possession even if it seems to be taking hours for the ball to emerge from the ruck.
9 looks at 10, now what?

Dont panic
You have possession and you have time because the ball is emerging slowly.
You have to use the time you have well, of course. 9 probably has a contingency tactic available (e.g. box kick, pick-and-go, etc.) which does not involve the backs so that's one option even though in the case of pick-and-go while there is a chance of a defensive mistake it's not certain to restore forward momentum.
All other options require that the backs must RUN to reform their line and to regain their depth, blind-side wing must hurry to plug the hole left by your 12 supporting the #8 and 10 should position himself carefully since this is probably not the time for a flat attack.

Regain momentum
This is easier said than done. You must initiate an attack that will put the defense on the back foot and to do this you must find a way to move forward.

Two main groups of options are available.
Attacking a formed defensive line ball-in-hand using a conventional back strike is difficult if not impossible unless an area of weakness can be identified. Is is probably better to continue with forward attacks from depth (pick-and-go, driving maul, etc.) aimed at concentrating the defense to make space wide. It is for this reason that many teams avoid 1st phase ball to the backs inside the opponent's 22. If, however, the "center of gravity" of the defense can be moved to one side crash-type attacks supported by forwards may be on elsewhere. This requires some of the forwards to retreat to regain depth so that they can support properly.
The second group of options involves putting the ball into space behind the defensive line and this is where tactical kicking comes into its own.

The 9 Factor
Second phase is where the fitness, skill and experience of the scrum-half comes into its own.

Recent internationals in which 9s have been substituted have demonstrated the enormous difference that a 9 can make in energising the attack - I've blogged "Giteau (at scrum-hald) makes the difference" that the substitution at 9 of Giteau - he of the fast, flat pass - for Gregan - a spent force, I'm afraid - was the key factor in Australia's defeat of the All Blacks in the 2007 Tri-Nations. Similar changes, unfortunately not for the better, have also been produced by Springbok substitutions.

Bearing in mind that it is absolutely crucial to get the attack moving forward at second-phase it is obvious to me that the slightest change in the vector and speed of the pass from the base of the breakdown can have a major effect. The scrum-half must challenge his first receiver to take the ball at pace by putting the ball in front of him. In situations where this isn't possible the static first receiver must immediately pass to another player who is at pace. Thus, it takes three clued-in players to energise the attack but 9's pass is always the crucial first step.

Clearly then, dithering at the breakdown, which includes appealing to the ref to penalise the opposition, is the certain recipe for disaster.

It goes without saying that 9s must prepare for this task and that coaches must ensure that they have the time and encouragement at practice to work on their fitness and skills.

Forwards in the backline
Support for back strikes after line-outs may also be provided by the forwards not in the line-out. (In fact, in this situation a large forward may sometimes even be used productively as the striker!) Generally, however, these forwards must be managed carefully. Bearing in mind that since forwards rarely actually practice support with the backs it is best to have a few simple rules which can be easily repeated -- like every time the situation arises -- otherwise all your careful back-move planning goes out the window.

The first of these rules should be that forwards are to leave the delivery of the ball and the strike to the backs unless a specific call is given.
The second might be that they should always line up in the same places -- i.e. they don't move in response to the call -- and only move into support after the move has been initiated. (It certainly helps if they understand the back calls at least as far as the designation of the striker!)
If forwards find themselves inadvertently in the back-line after broken play they should also follow some rules, the critical one being that it isn't a place to rest when they should be doing their work in the ruck!
Having said that 2 or 8 joining the line outside the wing can provide an extra option.

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Reading the defence

It is essential in back play to quickly form an appreciation of the opposition's defence system because this is the key to attacking tactics. As will be seen all defence systems are vulnerable. Note that having determined the opposition's system it is a good idea to use your knowledge wisely reserving your strike into the vulnerable position for situations when you are very well set up. Defences do change and most sides can adapt!

Briefly, UP defences are vulnerable to extra man moves and chips and grubbers, DRIFT defences are vulnerable to switches of vector and miss moves.

Back defence

The rules of back defence are based on an appreciation of back attack methods. We know that in running attacks the opposition will try to penetrate by fixing their men etc. so setting up a defence must combat this. The most obvious way to do this is not to give the attackers time to execute. Failing this we must set up a pattern of overlapping TAs that they can't penetrate. Top of Page

Recognition of these requirements has resulted in the two most widely used methods of defence i.e. UP and DRIFT. As will be seen, all defences, however, are vulnerable.

In an UP defence the defenders move up rapidly to snuff out attacks before they can get started with the idea of tackling the ball deliverers or failing that the striker before he can develop enough pace and momentum to fix his man. The success rate of defence in this sort of one-on-one situation is absolutely related to starting distance. The less distance there is between the defender and the attacker as he receives the ball the less time there is for the attacker to manage the defender's TA and the more likely the tackle will be made. Clearly, if the defender can arrive at the very moment the attacker receives the ball his job is just about done. As a result the key to UP defences is speed off the mark. "Set off at speed, arrive in balance" is the coach's injunction.

There are variations in UP defences.
4-UP is currently enjoying a vogue, its idea being not only to shut down the ball carrier but also, by placing other defenders between the ball-carrier and all his potential supporters, to stop him passing. (This is sometimes thought of as an "outside-in" defence having the effect of forcing the attack inwards because the outside men are covered.)
3-UP, where the wing lags to cover is more conservative and takes advantage of the fact that most strikes are made by centers not wings so the defending wing is there to gather any kicks.

It must be said that all UP defences are dependent on ability and commitment to the tackle. One back who is either reluctant or deficient in this department can defeat the entire effect of the defence. If the tackle in the interior is not made the other defenders must reverse course to cover their men and hope that cover will arrive to deal with the ball carrier. This is where speedy flankers prove their worth.

The idea of DRIFT defences is to concentrate defenders where they are most needed. DRIFT defences are more forgiving of tackling deficiencies even if they are vulnerable in other areas. In DRIFT defences the progress of the ball along the attacking line is followed by the defenders with little if any attempt being made to cover potential supporters and with the objective of eventually having enough overlapping TAs directly in front of the ball to make penetration impossible. They are thus "inside-out" defences.

As was emphasized above the one factor that both defensive systems share is that they are most successful as far forward as possible.


Lardner's comments hint at how an Up/Zone defence might work. This approach brings into focus the necessity for the defence to manage its TAs (Tackle Areas). It is implicit that the zone approach he suggests requires a very sophisticated and detailed appreciation of the attack which should probably not be attempted with inexperienced players. However, its elements: organization, communication and trust seem to me to be worth pondering.

Counter Attack

The ability to mount a decisive counter attack is often the difference between winning and losing a game. It is, however, usually supposed, in common with other back play myths, that counter attacks fall into the province of individual brilliance rather than planning and skill.
There is no doubt that while they provide individuals with the opportunity to demonstrate their genius my view is that for the rest of us there are a few guiding principles which will help even the most mundane player to improve his side's chances.

Successful counter attacks turn, like all other successful attacks, on switches. These may be both opportunistic or worked. Worked switches, at the risk of repetition, require planning.

The first principle is first to commit the defence to one tactic and only then produce a switch. Thus, for example, 15 fielding a failed touch kick outside his 22 commits the chase before he spirals a pass to his supporting wing in the middle of the field who attacks toward the far touchline. (I.e. 15 fixes his men and moves the ball into space)

The second principle is to do it quickly -- with all that that entails! Dithering is fatal. But remember, coming up with a loose ball in mid-field only becomes a counter attack if the ball can be delivered quickly to a well-placed striker.

The third principle is support.

I can think of no good reason for backs (in particular) not to spend a few moments every month or so working out scenarios which enhance their understanding of these principles.