INTRODUCING

Six completely re-written, fully illustrated and up-to-date downloads from the publisher of GRASSROOTS RUGBY.

THE LINEOUT
KICKING
BALL IN HAND
DEFENCE
and, in progress
STRATEGY, TACTICS and PHASE PLAY and THE SCRUM

Each for less than the price of a pint!

Visit the Downloads site for full details including Tables of Contents and Screenshots

Great news! Because we’ve recently reached our preliminary sales target for

Just click the GRASSROOTS RUGBY banner bottom right!

We’re on hold!

Due to the pressure of other projects I have decided to put this blog on hold for an indefinite period. I hope to return to full-time or at least part-time blogging in the future. In the interim may I thank my many readers for their interest.

PS
Rugby Coaching Notes at (http://www.eurekastreet.com/rcn/ahcoach.htm) continues in full operation and I’ve just (January 30th 2008) added a Backs Drill.

Excerpt from an article by DUNCAN JOHNSTONE - co-editor of Rugby Heaven.co.nz - in Stuff.co.nz Sunday, 25 November 2007.

Unbelievable? Inconceivable? Just plain stupid? A great idea that failed? How many games do players need to play to reach their peak?

“Some startling statistics reveal how Graham Henry’s controversial reconditioning and rotation policies left his All Blacks squad severely under-done for the rigours of a world cup.

“The starting XV who lost their quarterfinal to France averaged just over 12 games each for the entire year.

“It’s an indictment on the system when game time for a workaholic player like Jerry Collins is 1011 minutes the equivalent of less than 13 games of rugby.

“But there are some even more damning figures. First-choice halfback Byron Kelleher played the equivalent of just 8.5 games this year before heading off to his lucrative French club deal.

“Senior hooker Anton Oliver played the equivalent of just 10.6 matches.

“Injuries and troubled Super 14 selections contributed to seriously restrict Joe Rokocoko, whose time on the paddock panned out to be 10.2 matches while his Blues team-mate Ali Williams was left with 591 minutes of rugby 7.3 matches.

“Ironically the busiest player this season was Doug Howlett who packed in 1720 minutes the equivalent of 21.5 matches.

“Skipper Richie McCaw had a busy season despite being reconditioned. He started in 17 matches, played in 19 and got in 1288 minutes of action.

The more one thinks about the offload ( there was a time when I called it “passing out of the tackle” or “POOTT” before the term “offload” simplified all our lives) the more complicated it becomes.

Statistics show clearly, as if we needed to be convinced, that a team’s determination to keep the forward motion of the ball alive has a favourable impact on the final score. It doesn’t necessarily win matches but it surely makes them easier to win. However, raising the number of offloads by a team or by a player involves not just embedding the sure and certain knowledge that offloads do actually work but often a complete re-appraisal of what really takes place at the tackle/breakdown. Reducing the number of offloads that your opponents can complete takes a similar reappraisal of defence tactics.

Having said all that I have to apologise for what comes next. Actions that take place on the rugby field are extremely complicated. To a casual spectator they seem to be largely instinctive but nothing could be further from the truth. A good player assesses situations and deals with them according to a pre-learned hierarchy of actions. Spelling out these actions in detail always seems horribly trite not to say interminable especially when we know that the player can mentally review a very complicated list of possibilities and visualise the possible outcomes in seconds. What is important is that the player first of all has a well-constructed sequences of actions available and equally importantly that he or she maintains the ability to run through them logically.

For the ball-carrier offloading requires a sequence of decisions and actions which begins, hopefully, a few seconds before the realization that a tackle is “inevitable”. (This is not to suggest for a second that even inevitable tackles will actually succeed! Players completely miss 10% or so of their tackles through poor technique or failure of will and even if there is an actual laying on of hands there always exists the possibility of breaking out if the tackle is poorly constructed. ) The offload process thus begins when it appears that all efforts at escape and evasion have been exhausted. You’ve done your best to either avoid, fend-off or bulldoze the defender but now he or she is moving in for the tackle.

Before it happens, however, there needs to be a final check of the availability of your support.

I’ve ranted long and hard elsewhere (In “Rugby Coaching Notes”, for example) about the need for supporters to accept that tackles will happen to ball-carriers, to position themselves appropriately AND to make sure that the ball-carrier knows where they are.

Then comes the decision sequence: “How can I accept the tackle and maintain a position to make the offload?” It is important here for the ball-carrier to realise that he has some control over the sort of tackle he’s going to receive and this question can be broken down into: “How can I make him tackle me but leave my hands/arms free to make the pass?” and “How can I force my hands/arms free if he wraps me up?” (This is obviously the point where confidence in your upper-body strength built up during those long hours in the gym comes into play!) It goes without saying, I hope, that the first priority in any and all of these actions is to maintain possession of the ball!

The options here are to force a low tackle which will permit you to either pass as you fall or immediately after reaching the ground having turned your body or to make a “half-break” by ducking under the tackler’s arms so that you can pass behind him. (My strong suspicion is that the current increase in the number of high tackles is a direct result of the growing popularity of the second of these options.) Forcing the low tackle depends on the space available and the direction of approach of the tackler - if there’s space you can “run away,” at the last moment if there isn’t you can at least change direction to wrong-foot the tackler. Making the half-break might involve changing direction (side-step or swerve) to pass the defender on his “wrong” side i.e. the side he doesn’t expect.

If a wrap-up looks likely the tactic is to try to maintain a good base with your feet well placed to support a twisting movement to spring your arms free. This is obviously more easily said than done but without good foot position it is certainly nigh impossible. If the defender lifts you off the ground - not uncommon there days - your best bet may be to clench everything and try to get to ground with your arms free.

The last and perhaps the most crucial decision, strangely enough, is whether to pass or not!

Making a bad pass is almost as bad as dropping the ball so if you’re not confident you can complete a sympathetic pass it may be better to simply lay the ball back. This decision will be based on the amount of freedom available to your arms/hands, the position of your best supporter and the actions of the tackler and his supporters. It’s better to have the courage not to pass than to force an error on your team-mate. The supporter will be watching you intently and, if he sees hesitation on your part, is most likely to driver over and thus protect possession. This is second-best but it’s certainly better than watching a defender boot the loose ball down the field and scamper after it.

To sum up offloading is about preparation as much as execution. Having mental images of the opportunities and pitfalls of your possible actions will, as always, play a big part in their success. Good luck!

Excerpt from the Commentary section.

“…the one question that was critical therefore was whether an expansive approach would stand up under the pressure of a winner take all knockout competition.

It did not – and this has never been more dramatically illustrated than in the France v New Zealand quarter final game. In order to understand the immensity of this game, it is necessary to go back to November 2006 .

In that month, New Zealand defeated France – in France - by 47 points to 3. This suggested that New Zealand seemed to have found the right formula for beating one of their major world cup rivals. They scored 7 tries, creating just 43 rucks and kicked the ball 29 times. They made few passes – just 91 – but were clinical in their execution .

This formula disappeared however in their RWC quarter final match against France. Instead of creating 43 rucks, New Zealand created 165 or almost 4 times as many. This was around 100 more than a normal New Zealand game; was around 50% higher than the next highest in the tournament and is almost certainly the highest figure ever seen in an international match. It was at a scale that New Zealand had never remotely experienced before with an often seen expansive approach being replaced by forward attrition. The successful formula of recent years had been abandoned for some reason and New Zealand found themselves out of the competition.”

This interpretation certainly seems compelling (and the numbers it quotes are nearly incredible!) While the implications and mechanics of “creating a ruck” raise questions there seems to be little doubt that NZ got their game plan totally wrong!

What do you think?

I found this photo on the internet and downloaded it for my collection - today I looked at it closely and saw what Roncero has done to Van der Linde! Now that’s aggressive scrummaging.

I stupidly did not make a note of the source of the photo and I apopogise humbly to who ever took it for adding it to this post without permission. I’ll be happy to provide complete details of its provenance if the taker would contact me.

Point One: Any team can beat any other team on the day.
We saw it proved three times, now do we believe it? Argentina v France, England v Australia and France v New Zealand. All surprises, all totally unexpected - except by the winning teams one supposes - and all apparently inexplicable by the losers. Oh, it’s a good idea to reach for the usual suspects - the ref, the ball and the weather - but it’s a much better idea to take your lumps and make sure that it’ll never happen again. And just how do you do that? Repeat after me: “Any team can be beaten by any other team on the day.” Your job is to make sure it doesn’t happen to you!

Point Two: Do the basics well and the rest will happen.
They may be the sensation of the tournament but no-one is ever going to call the 2007 Pumas a wonderful team. Gusto yes, world-beating no! Of course they include the sublime Hernandez and the irritating but endearing Pichot but one to fifteen there are weaknesses. What they have done, however, almost to the last, is to show that if you execute your game plan perfectly, or nearly so, good things will inevitably accrue. Maybe it doesn’t matter too much exactly what your game plan is but obviously it must be carefully tailored to accentuate your strengths and hide your weaknesses. Mind you, it helps if your opponents forget Point One above (France - that’s if they ever knew it!) or are in a mindset from the Moon (Ireland) or have been coached into a stultifying mediocracy by a coach who is so risk averse that I bet he wears both belt and braces under his track-suit top (Scotland). Sadly, when fatigue and lack of real depth reduce the near perfection only a little a decent but certainly not spectacular team playing totally within themselves can upset your applecart (South Africa) and it’s then that the game plan shows its frayed edges. Still, thanks for the reminder!

Point Three: If at first you don’t succeed maybe it’s finally time for plain speaking.
Much has already been made of the meeting that took place in the English camp after they were demolished by the Springboks and much, much more will be made of it over the hundred years or so. Ostensibly players, coaches and management expressed their dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in no uncertain terms. What is amazing, however, is that things actually changed. A group of elite athletes playing in perhaps the best - certainly one of the toughest - leagues in the world transformed themselves overnight from a dejected rabble into a very fair facsimile of a winning team. Wonders will never cease! So it can happen no matter what our deepest fears predict. It is not possible to say that today’s England is a good team, it’s not even possible to say that the change we’ve seen will be sufficient to put them on the right track for the future but we can certainly say it is a team and my opinion is that it’s the first time in years we’ve been able to go that far.

Point Four: Never let up, ever and never think you can defend your way to victory.
Nuff said. France v England. It just wasn’t going to happen when you use the wrong substitutes - Michalak obviously with orders to control the game but too flaky to add to the defence, Harinordoquy too late to make a difference and, criminally, Poux much too late in the obviously tiring front row - and the wrong game plan - kick, kick, kick when run, run, run was obviously needed. I’m reliably informed that somebody once said that the best defence is attack. He was right.

Only four points? Yes, only four. But four crucial, central, important and indispensible lessons to learn.

Players left to watch!

Sébastien Chabal +1, +1, 0, 0, +3, +2
Brian Habana +3, +1, 0, +1, 0, +3
Frédéric Michalak 0, +3, +2, 0, +2, +1
Victor Matfield +2, 0, +2, 0, +2, +1
Juan Martín Hernández +1, +2, 0, +5, +2, +1

Looks like Habana and Hernandez are going to run away with it!

This is a fascinating article and deserves close attention in total. What follows is a excerpt.

Yorkshireman behind All Blacks’ downfall prepares for Le Crunch
France’s defence coach, David Ellis, tells William Fotheringham why Brian Ashton should be worried
Wednesday October 10, 2007, The Guardian

The spectacular victory over New Zealand that earned France a semi-final place against their old enemies from this side of the Channel was, ironically enough, “made in England” - with one of the keys to the upset in Cardiff being the steadfast rearguard masterminded by their Yorkshire-born defence coach David Ellis.

The official post-match statistics, somewhat impromptu in their nature, did not actually do justice to France’s achievement in restraining an All Blacks side that spent long spells in their 22 - at one point managing over 30 consecutive phases of play in a lengthy close-quarters battle - and enjoyed almost three-quarters of possession.

According to Ellis’s own statistics, France made a total of 299 tackles, their highest in any match under the Yorkshireman. Critically, they missed just 15. “That’s around five per cent, normally you would look for about nine per cent missed so that’s as good as it gets,” he said. Such is the Ellis effect that the staunchest defender of them all was the Toulouse back-row forward Thierry Dusautoir, who is only at the World Cup because of an injury to Elvis Vermeulen, the author of 38 tackles.
…
What mattered as much as the tackles themselves was the target of the tacklers. Critically, Ellis said yesterday, France’s tacklers were instructed not to go for All Black legs but to tackle around the upper body, in pairs if possible, in order to prevent the quick off-loads that had given New Zealand such impetus in the past.

“They had perfected off-loading and it was unstoppable,” said Ellis. “We knew we had to stop the off-loads. We weren’t putting them to ground. If you put them to ground with leg tackles, they have a system where they have a support runner who is always behind the player being tackled.

“The ball carrier goes into contact, the support runner comes over the top, takes the second tackler out, there is a third support runner just in case, [the scrum-half] Byron Kelleher gets the ball and it is gone. It’s a two-man ruck. There was no point in putting them to ground close to the gainline because we’ve got to come back on side, going backwards a metre at a time.

“If we block the off-load, they are in a foreign situation, the ball is slowed down. [The French players] can block it. There were several occasions in the second half when [Frédéric] Michalak hit the guy, Jauzion was in next, we were in, we kept them on their feet, the ball is off the ground, they’ve taken it into contact, scrum for us. They can’t put two men into the ruck, they put five men, their whole structure has gone completely.”
…